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In the first part of this paper,1 the underlying
privacy concerns of multi-application smart card
schemes were identified. In relation to the use of
global unique identifiers, the regulatory
framework for the smart card manufacturer was
assessed. To demonstrate that multi-application
smart card technology can be reconciled with the
principles of data protection legislation, in
particular with the requirements that personal
data be processed fairly and lawfully,2 three
technical solutions will now be analysed and
commented upon.3 The first two solutions will
relate to the role and functioning of the scheme’s
application providers. The third solution consists
of the development of a less privacy-infringing
smart card technology in relation to the use of
unique identifiers.
A. Introduction:
Generally speaking, information technologies
are not privacy-killing by substance. They become
privacy killing by side-effects, precisely because a
particularity of a technology invented or
implemented for a particular and legitimate use
appears to be re-routed for another purpose. In fact,
from a data protection viewpoint, engineers may
very often appear to be very naïve. From their side,
advocates of privacy rights seem to be extremist and
unable to understand technological requirements
and the technical feasibility of certain solutions.
The subtle - and difficult – approach in the
SmartCities project was a collaborative one by
engineers and data protection specialists. In the
framework of informal workshops, these two
opposite sides of the spectrum were given time to
explain their concerns.  Although it may have
taken time to reach a common understanding, all
participants agreed on two fundamental principles: 
 The general data protection Directive 95/46/EC
is no longer negotiable and such workshops
cannot be the forum to re-write or to amend
legal requirements. Furthermore, roughly
speaking, given the substantial financial impulse
offered by the European Commission to the
SmartCities project, the legal and mandatory
European requirements could not be ignored;
 The protection of privacy and personal data has
its price. At a first glance, we may consider that
a legal constraint tends to reduce the benefits of
the deployment of such a multi-application
smart card. However, this is a short-term vision.
A multi-application smart card scheme has to
involve a win/win approach for all parties
involved. Card holders and citizens will have
little confidence in the smart card if they have to
renounce to a substantial part of their individual
freedom to get the benefits of the scheme
concerned. In the long term a privacy-killing
scheme gets a bad reputation and dramatically
raises the level of Big Brother paranoia. As a
concrete result, this may lead to a dual society.
The collaborative approach described above has
been a success thanks to the constructive spirit of
all the partners within the SmartCities consortium
and they should be given the credit they deserve. As
a result, the tangible output was a team of privacy-
minded engineers and technology-minded lawyers
working together to develop a privacy-friendly
multi-application smart card scheme. The three
scenarios described below constitute a concrete
output of this techno-legal brainstorming.
B. Scenario one: avoid 
cross-profiling by the use of
symmetric keys
1. Presentation of the solution
A smart card is very often identified by a serial
number readable by software, i.e., by all the
applications embedded in the card and by the
smart card terminals. At the first glance, a very
simple way to prevent global cross-profiling
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activities  by the data warehouse consists in the
encryption of the so-called Smart card Serial
Number4 by a secret key.5 Each application
provider will have its particular key to scramble
and de-scramble the unique SSN. 
In this scenario, a customer is no longer identified by
the Smart card Serial Number but by an encryption
of this number, proper to each application. As a
concrete result, data issued from different
application providers cannot any longer be merged
on the simple basis of different encrypted numbers.
The main advantage of this approach is that
each transaction stored in the data warehouse will
be characterized by this particular SSN and the
identity of a card holder will be diverged in
multiple pseudonyms, depending on the number of
application providers. Therefore, by default, the
data warehouse will not able to link different
pseudonymous SSNs to each other or to the
original SSN of a particular data subject. In other
words, it is not possible to discover that bus
traveller BCD198 is the same person as library
reader AEF435, nor the same as the swimmer
ABC634 or the person holding the smart card with
the unique Smart card Serial Number ABE403.
It has to be underlined that this method still
allows each application provider to have a global
overview of its own customers’ transactions, but,
as in a mono-application smart card, such an
overview is limited to its own application(s). 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that,
according to recital 26 of Directive 95/46/EC,
scrambled personal data remain “personal data”
and thus benefit from the protection offered by
this Directive.7 Although it is very unlikely that the
data warehouse, i.e., a data processor, will be able
to identify the data subject via an encrypted SSN,
an application provider can identify the data
subject by using reasonable means. For instance,
by applying the same secret key, initially used to
scramble the unique SSN, the application provider
can de-scramble the pseudonymous SNN and get
back the original SSN.8
2. Permitting a local cross-profiling by
using cryptography
Directive 95/46/EC states that personal data i) may
only be processed fairly and lawfully and ii) that
they may only be collected for specified, explicit
and legitimate purposes and not further processed
in a way incompatible with those purposes.9 In the
light of these two principles, it will not be
legitimate for any application provider to get
access to the personal data concerning the use of a
smart card from other applications. This implies,
inter alia, that a library has no legitimate interest
to know all the details of the use of public
transport by library visitors. However, in some
circumstances a limited cross-profile between
specific applications may be considered legitimate.
It could, for instance, be perfectly legitimate for a
library to try to have an overview of the means of
transport used by card holders visiting the library.
Perhaps the library can then offer a price rebate for
the use of public transport, for instance, to avoid
traffic jams or to encourage people with a low
revenue to go to the library. This purpose seems
legitimate for both the library and the transport
company, i.e., two distinct data controllers.
Unfortunately, the data warehouse in the
configuration described above cannot technically
achieve this global overview, because the
application providers do not share the same ID of
the same card holder.  In fact, they do share the
same ID, but in such an encrypted way that the
data warehouse is unable to merge data relating to
the library visitor with transport data on a one-to-
one basis. This would have been possible if both
the library and the transport company
communicated their respective secret keys to the
data warehouse. It is evident that this solution is
difficult to advocate or to accept, to the degree that
this key should remain secret and cannot be
divulged to other persons than the application
provider. After a few months the data warehouse
will very likely know the secret keys of all the
application providers. By linking secret keys to each
Figure 2: Pseudonymous SSN by using a secret
key proper to each application6
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other, the data warehouse will be technically able
to get a global overview of each citizen’s behaviour. 
In this regard, some recommendations
concerning the cross-profiling of personal data can
be brought forward, while respecting one’s privacy.
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that cross-
profiling is not a general or systematic rule within
a multi-application smart card scheme. In princi-
ple, and with regard to data protection issues, all
data collected by the data warehouse from one
application provider have to be considered as stored
in a waterproof compartment, isolated from the
data compartments of other applications.10 In
particular circumstances, however, the merger of
secured compartments can be performed, provided
i) adequate privacy safeguards are adopted and ii)
to the extent that the purpose of this punctual
cross-profiling matches with the initial processing
purposes.
An a priori a cross-profiling procedure has to
be set up between the data warehouse and the
application providers embedded in smart card
schemes. The following privacy-compliant
procedure can be proposed:
 The application providers agree on the
questions on which they want to get an
aggregated answer, e.g., how many library
customers are using the bus to go to the
library? What is the average distance between
the library and the library visitor’s home?  In
this scenario, this is crucial. The library may be
funded to know how many readers are taking
the bus to go to the library, but certainly not to
know all the details of bus transportation not
linked to a visit to the library;
 Application provider A and application
provider B define the transactions, e.g., by
means of a transaction table on which they
intend to achieve a cross-profile, e.g., by time-
slicing, the location of the card reader, the
profile of the card holder, etc;
 The data warehouse extracts the relevant data
for applications of A and B;11
 Similar to the session key of the SSL Protocol,
the data warehouse randomly generates a
session key;12
 The data warehouse communicates the relevant
scrambled serial numbers to application pro-
viders A and B, by using the secret session key;
 Each application provider applies his own
secret key to get back to the original SN. The
SN is then encrypted by each application
provider by using the common secret key;
 New scrambled SN are sent back to the data
warehouse. Those SNs are now common to
both application providers. The data
warehouse merges the two transaction tables to
achieve a one-to-one global cross-table;
 The data warehouse uses relevant data mining
techniques to answer the questions asked by
application providers;
 The results are communicated in an aggregate
form to the application providers concerned.
3. Pro’s and cons
By setting up such a kind of procedure, both the
data controller and the data processor will be able
to take the benefit from punctual and aggregate
cross-profiling actions, while at the same time
guaranteeing a high level of personal data
protection. However, this solution does not offer
the highest level of protection against systematic
cross-profiling as far as the data warehouse
remains technically able to link virtual identities of
the same individual by, e.g., performing the above
mentioned matching transactions.
Although the strength of this solution lies
within the secret key used to scramble the unique
SSN, the same secret key remains the Achilles
tendon. As indicated above, the scrambled SSN
can be de-scrambled with the same convenience as
it was scrambled in the first place. This not only
demonstrates that collected data remain personal
data, but also that the built-in security measures
can be neutralized very easily. In this regard,
reference can be made to the Article 29 Working
Party’s opinion on the Liberty Alliance Project.
Although in the latter project the unique identifier
is replaced by pair-wise identities, the Article 29
Working Party underscores that identities can still
be shared among the participants.13 For this
reason, personal data protection concerns remain
eminent and alternatives with a higher degree of
security should be considered.
C. Scenario two: the use of fully
anonymous data
1. Description of the scenario
Instead of encrypting the unique SSN, and thus
creating a pseudonym for the card holder for each
application provider concerned, a more privacy-
friendly scenario consists in the transmission of
pure anonymous data to the data warehouse.
Furthermore, each application provider, for his
own purpose, will use a proper ID without any
link to the SSN.
Cross-profiling is
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Application providers will transfer all data
generated by the use of a smart card to the central
data warehouse, this irrespective of the
information it contains. In this scenario, a
distinction should be made between two types of
data. On the one hand, the use of the smart card,
e.g., a cash withdrawal from an ATM machine,
will generate data concerning the person
withdrawing money from his account, while on the
other hand, data concerning the financial
transaction will be generated and processed, e.g.,
the place of the ATM, time, amount, etc. 
Figure 3: Personal data vs anonymous
Transaction data
The legal regime for these two categories of
data is very different, if not opposite. 
According to recital 26 of Directive 95/46/EC,
the principles of data protection will only apply to
information concerning an identified or identifiable
person and will not apply to data rendered
anonymous in such a way that the data subject, i.e.,
the card holder, is no longer identifiable. 
In this regard, application providers will only
send transaction data to the central data
warehouse, this by stripping all data referring,
even indirectly, to an identifiable natural person.
Therefore, the data warehouse will only contain
anonymous transaction data, not subject to any
legislation in the field of personal data protection.
In consequence, application providers are entitled
to cross-profile data stored and processed in the
data warehouse without, e.g., considering the
purposes or legitimate character thereof. 
From a data protection viewpoint, this solution
is quite satisfying as long as sufficient guarantees
are given that the data processed in the data
warehouse are and remain anonymous. In this
particular case, the personal Data Protection
Directive does not apply.
2. Socio-demographic granularity 
Data warehouses may find it difficult to generate
value-added and usable information from
anonymous data. Therefore, before sending the
anonymous data to the data warehouse,
application providers may add general information
to the transaction data, e.g., gender, age category
and neighbourhood. Of course, particular
attention should be paid to the granularity of such
a kind of socio demographic data. If the crossing
of the various criteria may lead to a very small
group of individuals or to one single individual,14
the data are no longer anonymous.
This granularity can be reached by sufficiently
big slices of range. What is the added value of
knowing that a woman is born 4 July 1950?
Should it not be enough to know that she is in the
age category of persons between 50 to 55 years? A
convenient solution may be to require that every
crossed category contains at least a hundred or
more individuals.
3. Pro’s and cons
This scenario appears to be well balanced.
Application providers have their own customer ID
and they are still able to analyse the behaviour of
their own customers inside their own application.
Furthermore, by transferring pure transaction
data, i.e., anonymous data, to the data
warehouse, they participate in - and benefit from -
a global aggregate view of what is happening in
the multi-application smart card scheme.
From a data protection viewpoint the scenario
may appear as being highly idyllic. No more per-
sonal data are processed by the data warehouse and
no individual cross-profiling is done. Nevertheless,
this approach seems to us to be a little bit too naïve. 
In fact, the Global Unique Identifier still
remains accessible on the card by every
application running on it and it would be very
surprising that every application should ignore it.
In the present scenario only organisational
measures have been adopted to avoid an excessive
cross profiling between applications. This has
been done on the basis of article 17 of the general
data protection Directive 95/46/EC. 15
However, this is not sufficient. The same
article of this Directive requires that in addition to
the organisational measures, “technical” ones be
adopted. This combination of measures is
perfectly coherent with the concept of security.
Security cannot be exclusively based on human
goodwill. Although codes of good practice are
useful and necessary, they cannot or may not
replace the technical measures. In a certain way, it
makes sense that application providers agree not
to use such a convenient global unique identifier
PERSONAL DATA TRANSACTION DATA
All data relating to the





All data relating to the
transaction without including
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but, in the end, who will monitor that they do so
in practice? Moreover, if it appears that the SSN is
used among various applications, which will take
care of that? That is why technical measures have
to be put into place: not to replace organisational
security measures but just to enhance them.
D. Scenario three: replacing the
static SSN by a dynamic
cryptographic function
As indicated before,16 smart card manufacturers
often include a worldwide and unique serial number
in their cards. From a data protection viewpoint, the
use of these GUIs is only allowed if it is used for
legitimate and particular purposes, e.g., to identify
malfunctioning cards or to counter the fraudulent
use of cards.17 There is, however, one side-effect. As
indicated before, the GUI can be used for other
purposes, notably for cross-profiling purposes.18 19
If, however, the use of an identifier should
extend beyond the particular purposes of that
application, the unique identifier could be
considered an identifier of general application and
subject to a more stringent legal regime.20
In this regard, an appropriate technical
solution may be the following: 
 The static unique SSN remains on the card, but
is not any longer accessible by applications
running on it.  Only one person, e.g., the smart
card manufacturer, has access to the SSN; 
 All applications have access to a random-
asymmetric-cryptographic-identification
function of the card.
At a first glance, we saw in Scenario one that
encrypting the SSN with a unique key proper to
each application provider may help to guarantee
non-abusive cross-profiling. This solution was not
completely satisfactory, because the encryption was
performed by each application provider and
decryption was thus possible. The first enhancement
proposed relates to an automatic “on the fly” encry-
ption of the SSN by the smart card.  Considering
that this first encryption is done with a public key,
this key may be securely stored on the smart card.
However, this solution is not the panacea. Of
course, the SSN will only be known by the smart
card manufacturer holding the corresponding
private key, but the encrypted SSN remains a GUI
that still may be used by every application to
perform cross-profiling activities. For this reason, a
second privacy enhancement can be proposed:
before encrypting the SSN, random data will
added to the SSN,21 and this couple, i.e., the SSN
and the random data, will then be automatically
encrypted by the smart card.
By designing such a privacy-enhancing smart
card the original purpose of the SSN is kept: the
card manufacturer still can identify a card by i)
decrypting the SNN with its private key and ii)
removing the added random data. At the same
time, a cross-profile based on the SSN becomes
impossible because the SSN remains secret and the
identification function, even if available to each
application running on the card, will always return
a different ID.
Finally, it is important to make clear that the
hardware and software used in the scheme22 could
be built in such a manner that one’s identity is
only verified, without revealing it. An example of
such a less privacy-killing solution can be given by
referring to the Processor Serial Number (PSN) of
the Intel Pentium III processor.23 A solution to
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reconcile the advantages of the PSN24 with the
concerns in the field of privacy, notably the use of
a GUI, could be to replace the serial number
identification instruction by a serial number
verification instruction. In the first scenario, an
active component is able to read the PSN.25 In the
second scenario, the active component is only able
to check if a serial number freely given by the data
subject is the exact serial number of the installed
processor. The authentication function of the PSN
is preserved while the privacy-killing aspect is
widely reduced.
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FOOTNOTES
1 Ewout Keuleers and Jean-Marc Dinant, Data protection:
multi-application smart cards: the use of global unique
identifiers for cross-profiling purposes –[2003] 19 CLSR 480 
2 Cf., article 6,1 (a) of Directive 95/46/EC.
3 Cf., infra point 5. 
4 Hereafter referred to as SNN.
5 For efficiency reasons it can be proposed that for
performing this encryption, single symmetric encryption
functions are used.
6 F is a symmetric cryptographic function, h, k, g, are secret
keys belonging to application provider A, B and C. Figure 1
is displayed in Part I of this paper [2003] 19 CLSR 481 
7 Recital 26 of Directive 95/46/EC states that the
principles of protection must apply to any information
concerning an identified or identifiable person.
“Whereas, to determine whether a person is identifiable,
account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably
to be used either by the controller or by any other person
to identify the said person; whereas the principles of
protection shall not apply to data rendered anonymous in
such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable”.
8 This may seems strange to non-lawyers. However, in
application of the recital 26 stated above, there is no
doubt that personal data that are made pseudonymous
by a third party remain personal data as long as the
reverse identification remains technically feasible.
9 Cf. article 6, 1 (a) en (b) of Directive 95/46/EC, supra.
10 In this regard, reference can be made to article 17 of
Directive 95/46/EC. In application of its paragraph 2, the
controller must implement appropriate technical and
organizational measures to protect personal data against
accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss,
alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access, in particular
where the processing involves the transmission of data
over a network, and against all other unlawful forms of
processing.
A similar obligation is imposed on the data processor,
e.g., a data warehouse.
11 Including scrambled Serial Number.
12 A marvellous solution should have been that A
encrypts the scrambled SN of B by using his secret key.
13 Article 29 WP, Working Document on on-line
authentication services, 29 January 2003, WP68. 
14 Eg to a women born on July 1950, taking the bus
every Sunday at 13PM and living in the 2nd Street.
15 Article 17 Security of processing: Member States shall
provide that the controller must implement appropriate
technical and organizational measures to protect
personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction
or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or
access, in particular where the processing involves the
transmission of data over a network, and against all
other unlawful forms of processing.
Having regard to the state of the art and the cost of
their implementation, such measures shall ensure a level
of security appropriate to the risks represented by the
processing and the nature of the data to be protected.
16 Cf., point 4.
17 E.g., it is not possible to have the same GUI, so
identity, twice.
18 In this regard, reference can be made to the opinion
of the Belgian Data Protection Authority concerning the
use of GUI in relation to e-government and the electronic
ID card. Commission de la protection de la vie prive, Avis
n°19/2002, 10 juin 2002, p.9-11.
19 A well-known example of the re-definition of the
initial purpose is the Social Security Number in the
United States. Although the number displayed on a U.S.
social security card was initially used for public health
purposes, this number is nowadays used for other
purposes, in particular for the identification of persons
20 Article 8 (7) of Directive 95/46/EC states that Member
States shall determine the conditions under which a
national identification number or any other identifier of
general application may be processed. As an identifier of
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general application could be considered every identifier
that is a priori not designated for a specific purpose, or
every identifier that was designated for a particular
purpose, but is used for other purposes. An eloquent
example is the Social Security Number in the United States. 
21 By adding random noise to the unique SSN, the
cryptographic function will each time generate a
different identity.
22  Cf., recital 46 of Directive 2002/58/EC.
23  http://www.bigbrotherinside.org 
24  E.g., one that will be able to trace its computer in
case of theft.
25  Such as an Active-X control or a Java applet.
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